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Abstract
The concept of a “system” is foundational to physics, but the question of how
observers identify systems is seldom addressed. Classical thermodynamics restricts
observers to finite, finite-resolution observations with which to identify the systems
on which “pointer state” measurements are to be made. It is shown that system
identification is at best approximate, even in a finite world, and that violations of
the Leggett–Garg and Bell/CHSH (Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt) inequalities emerge
naturally as requirements for successful system identification.
Keywords: Bell/CHSH inequality; coarse-graining; decoherence; Leggett–Garg inequality;
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1 Introduction
The idea that all finite observers are characterized by uncertainty and must pay, in energetic
currency, to reduce their uncertainty was introduced into classical physics by Boltzmann
[1]. Shannon [2] showed that information obtained from observations can be naturally
quantized into answers to yes/no questions and hence measured in bits. Landauer [3, 4]
then showed that such information has been “obtained” and is available for future use only
after it has been irreversibly recorded on some physical medium. The resulting classical
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theory of observation—the exchange of energy for information—states that, for any finite,
physically implemented observer O, each bit of irreversibly recorded uncertainty reduction
(equivalently, each bit of information gain) costs c(O)kBT , where kB is Boltzmann’s constant,
T is temperature, and c(O) ≥ ln2 is a measure of O’s information-aquisition efficiency that
can for simplicity be considered constant. As all classical observations in practice take place
at T > 0, this energetic cost is always positive. This classical theory of observation has two
familiar practical consequences: observations are limited to finite resolution and records of
their outcomes to finite bit strings, and only some finite number of such finite-resolution
observations can be made in any finite time.
The consequences of this classical, thermodynamic limitation to finite, finite-resolution ob-
servations have been investigated in both classical and quantum settings, particularly as
they bear on issues of noise (i.e., uncontrolled degrees of freedom) and measurement un-
certainty. It has been known since the pioneering work of Spekkens and colleagues [5, 6],
for example, that classical statistical mechanics reproduces wave-packet quantum theory
in the special case in which wave packets are Gaussian. Jennings and Leifer [7] review
this and other work, showing that classical statistical mechanics reproduces “quantum”
features and behavior including the uncertainty principle, non-commutativity of measure-
ments, state teleportation and the no-cloning theorem when a finite-resource restriction
limiting the number and resolution of measurements is imposed. Krechmer [8] shows that
“quantum” measurement disturbance and non-commutativity of observables result when-
ever two measurement devices are calibrated using the same physical standard.
My aim here is to investigate a different set of consequences of the classical thermodynamic
restriction to finite energy resources and hence to finite, finite-resolution observations: its
consequences for an observer’s ability to identify the physical system being observed. The
question of system identification has largely been neglected by theoretical physics, although
it is of obvious practical relevance to experimental physics. Discussions of quantum mea-
surement, for example, standardly examine the interaction between an observer and a fixed,
well-defined system that is typically stipulated a priori by stipulating its Hilbert space (for
reviews, see [9, 10]). System identification has received more attention from engineers and
computer scientists. Moore, for example, proved in 1956 that finite, finite-resolution ob-
servations cannot fully determine the state space of an otherwise-uncharacterized physical
system; in particular, they cannot determine its state-space dimension d ([11] Theorem 2;
see [12, 13] for discussion). This result underlies the proven unsolvability of the halting
problem in classical computer science [14]. Both of these results, however, rely on limits
in which numbers of degrees of freedom become arbitrarily large, and neither considers the
quantitative cost of system identification.
Here I characterize the thermodynamic cost of system identification in a general, oper-
ational framework covering both classical and quantum systems and investigate some of
its consequences. The next section characterizes the system identification problem opera-
tionally as a search problem constrained by a finite-resource restriction. The consequences of
this restriction for system identification and characterization are then discussed (Section 3),
and the finite-resource restriction is shown to forbid the arbitrary refinement of state spaces
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of observed systems to assumed “objective” or “ontic” state spaces even when these are
(Section 4). I then focus on two types of system-identification problems that regularly arise
in practice: the identification of a single system at multiple, significantly separated times
(Section 5) and the identification of a single system by multiple, spacelike-separated ob-
servers (Section 6). I show in each case that classical correlations of measurement outcomes
are insufficient, in principle, for reliable system identification. A similar point regarding
the second class of problems has been made previously by Grinbaum [15]. Violations of
Leggett–Garg [16] and Bell [17] inequalities, respectively, thus arise naturally as require-
ments for reliable system identification in these settings. These results extend and elaborate
on previous work of a more systems-theoretic nature [12, 13, 18, 19]. The general theory of
observation as a physical process, including the central role of the observer’s memory as an
encoding of observational outcomes, has also recently been discussed by Kupervasser [20].
2 Formalizing System Identification as a Search Pro-
cess
Characterizing the thermodynamic cost of system identification requires redescribing ob-
servation in a way that makes the process of system identification explicit. Consider the
standard, classical “picture” of observation shown in Figure 1. Here the “observer” is a
physical system that interacts with a “system of interest” to obtain observational outcomes.
Both observer and system are embedded in a surrounding environment, which can be re-
garded as “everything else” in the universe. This classical picture of observation is carried
over unchanged into quantum theory, where the “observer” now terminates the von Neu-
mann chain [21] by recording their outcome(s) in a thermodynamically irreversible way. It
provides, by including the surrounding environment, the setting for environmental deco-
herence [22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28]. Tegmark has emphasized that the observer O in this
setting comprises only the degrees of freedom that record observational outcomes, while
the system S comprises only the “pointer” degrees of freedom that specify these outcomes;
all other degrees of freedom are considered part of the “environment” E and traced over
[29]. Tracing out the environment assures that information about the state of S reaches O
only through the channel defined by the O − S interaction, specified in Figure 1b by the
Hamiltonian HOS. The alternative channel via the environment E, given by the Hamilto-
nian HSE + HE + HOE, contributes only classical noise. In the alternative “environment
as witness” formulation of decoherence developed by Zurek and colleagues [30, 31, 32, 33],
O is assumed to be located sufficiently far from S that HOS ∼ 0. In this formulation, all
information about S obtained by O flows through the channel HSE+HE+HOE. The state
|E〉 of the environment is regarded as “encoding” this information, with the encoding of
information about the positions of macroscopic objects by the ambient photon field as the
canonical example.
This conventional conception of observation, even when made precise using the formalism of
decoherence, tells us nothing about how the observer identifies the system of interest. The
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Figure 1: (a) A classical observer interacts with a system of interest; both are embedded in
a surrounding environment. (b) Interactions between observer (O), system of interest (S)
and environment (E) enabling environmental decoherence. The Hamiltonian HOS transfers
outcome information from S to O; HSE, and HOE decohere S and O respectively. Adapted
from Figure 1 in ref. [29].
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system S is given a priori in Figure 1: the interactions HOS, HOE, HES, HS, and HE are all
assumed to be given and well-defined. To include system identification in the picture, it is
useful to describe it in operational terms. Suppose I want Alice to report the observational
outcome registered by a particular macroscopic apparatus located in a laboratory filled
with many other systems. How much information do I need to give Alice to assure that
she reports the outcome from the right apparatus? In this scenario, the finite-resource
restriction on Alice is clear: I can give Alice at most a finite description of the apparatus
that I want her to report an outcome from. I could instruct her, for example, to locate a
black laptop labeled “data 3,” running linux, with a counter window open, and to report
the outcome displayed in the counter window. I could add that “data 3” is connected to an
ADC in the third rack from the right wall. Alice must then enter the laboratory and look
for, using observational means at her disposal, an apparatus matching my finite description.
The informational basis of this operational scenario can be made precise as follows:
Finite-resource restriction: No observer can employ more that a finite num-
ber of finite-resolution observational outcomes to identify a system of interest.
Classically, an observer subject to the finite-resource restriction has only a finite number of
finite-resolution criteria for system identification; in quantum theory, this corresponds to a
finite number of discrete-valued observables. Such criteria or observables can be considered
to be binary without loss of generality.
It is obviously circular to assume that, when Alice enters the laboratory, she can identify
the apparatus satisfying her finite criteria (or finite observables) without having to look at
anything else: this is equivalent to assuming that the apparatus is given a priori and hence
does not need to be identified. To identify the apparatus S, Alice must distinguish it, using
her criteria/observables, from everything else in the laboratory, i.e., from E. Alice must,
in other words, employ her criteria/observables to search the combined system W = SE
until she finds S. Hence, she is in the position illustrated in Figure 2b, not that of Figure
2a as is standardly assumed.
To make this idea of searching W for S precise, suppose as above that an observer O and
world W are given as collections of physical degrees of freedom, and assume for the present
that they are quantum systems characterized by Hilbert spaces HO and HW , respectively.
Suppose further that O can perform n distinct (but not necessarily orthogonal) binary-
outcome measurementsMi onW , that O’s thermodynamic cost per bit of recorded outcome
is c(O)kBT as above, that deploying the Mi has no other energetic consequences, and that
O’s interaction withW consists entirely of deploying theMi. In this case, each of theMi can
be regarded as extracting one bit of information from W and exhausting c(O)kBT of waste
heat into W . The operations Mi can be regarded informally as “questions to Nature” such
as “is what I see before me a laptop?” or “is it black?” and formally as Hermitian operators
on HW in the usual way. No assumption need be made at this point about whether the
Mi commute; this question is addressed in Section 3. For simplicity, suppose O deploys
the Mi one at a time in the fixed order i = 1, ..., n, that each of the Mi is deployed for a
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Figure 2: (a) An observer equipped with an observable (e.g., a meter reading) interacts
with a pre-given system S. Adapted from Figure 1 in ref. [34]. (b) An observer with finite
resources must look for the system of interest by probing the “world” W in which it is
embedded.
fixed time ∆t(O), the time required for O to record one bit, and that O makes m cycles of
measurements. The total elapsed time during which O makes measurements on W is then
nm∆t(O). Taking the O −W interaction to be given by a Hamiltonian operator HOW on
HO ⊗HW , the total action is
∫ nm∆t(O)
t=0
dt HOW (t) = nm∆t
(O)c(O)kBT. (1)
To make HOW (t) explicit in the simplest case of sequential, equal-duration measurements,
let Π(i,m)(t) be the rectangular Pi function with offset i, 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, duty cycle n, and
the number of cycles m, i.e.,
Π(i,m)(t) =
m−1∑
j=0
Π(t− (nj + i+ 1/2)∆t(O)) (2)
where
Π(t) =


0 if |t| > 1/2
1/2 if |t| = 1/2
1 if |t| < 1/2
.
This Π(i,m)(t) is a sequence, starting at t = i, of m unit-height rectangular pulses with
width ∆t(O) and separation n∆t(O) as shown in Figure 3. In this case, we can write, for
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0 ≤ t ≤ nm∆t(O),
HOW (t) =
n−1∑
i=0
Π(i,m)(t)Mi, (3)
with the heat dissipated by the action of the kth measurement operator during the first
j ≤ m cycles of measurement given by
(1/∆t(O))
∫ nj∆t(O)
t=0
dt Π(k,j)(t)Mk = jc
(O)kBT. (4)
If the requirement of a fixed sequence of equal-duration measurements is now dropped and
O is simply assumed to make N total observations, Equation (3) can be generalized, for
0 ≤ t ≤ N∆t(O), to
HOW (t) =
n∑
i=1
αi(t)Mi, (5)
subject to the constraints that, at all t,
n∑
i=1
αi(t) = 1, (6)
and, for any positive integer k < N ,
(1/∆t(O))
n∑
i=1
∫ (k+1)∆t(O)
t=k∆t(O)
dt αi(t)Mi = c
(O)kBT. (7)
Here the function αi(t) is naturally interpreted as the probability of deploying the measure-
ment Mi at t. The sequence of outcomes obtained will depend on the αi(t); however, the
incremental heat dissipation, expressed in Equation (7), of the measurements will not.
With ∆t(O) finite, t can be treated as having only integer values k∆t(O) and hence regarded
as a counter. This counter must be internal to O, as otherwise the values of t would be
observational outcomes obtained from an external clock by some subset of the Mi and the
above representation would be circular. The record of O’s N observations can, in this case,
be represented as Table 1 indexed by integer values of t:
A table of this form contains all of the information about W available to O following N
observations. The energetic cost of these data to O is Nc(O)kBT , which is dissipated into
W as waste heat. The counter t can, alternatively, be regarded as counting sets of k
simultaneously measurable outcomes obtained “in parallel” at a cost of kc(O)kBT ; however,
here we will maintain the convention that outcomes are obtained sequentially at discrete
time steps.
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Figure 3: The first three components of Π(i,m)(t) of Equation (2) in the first and nth cycles
of deploying the Mi.
Table 1: Sample record of O’s observational outcomes from W , starting at t = 1.
Step t Measure Mi, i ≤ n Outcome xi ∈ {0, 1}
1 1 1
2 2 0
3 2 1
... ... ...
N 4 0
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As noted above, finite observations at finite resolution cannot fully determine the state space
of an otherwise-uncharacterized system [11]. The only information about W available to
O are the outcomes x1...xN of N finite-resolution observations; hence, O cannot determine
the state space of W , i.e., the assumed Hilbert space HW or even its dimension dW , and
ipso facto can specify the measurements Mi being performed onW only operationally. The
complete set of possible outcomes of the Mi are, however, fully specified: each action with
Mi produces an outcome xi ∈ {0, 1}. Associating each of these xi with a unit basis vector~i
constructs a binary spaceW with dimension dW ≤ n (equality if theMi are orthogonal and
all are employed at least once), which we can call the apparent or observable state space
of W for O. Each “observation” by O can, therefore, be thought of not as an action with
some Mi on W but as an operation on W with a binary-valued POVM Ei that selects the
same outcome xi as Mi. The Hilbert spaces standardly employed in quantum theory are
constructed in this way using possible outcomes as basis vectors and are hence “apparent”
in this sense. The operators Mi are, similarly, standardly defined in terms of the outcomes
they produce, i.e., as operators on such apparent state spaces; in this case, the relation
Ei = M
†
iMi can be viewed as operationally defining Mi. This standard practice justifies
our starting assumption that O and W can be treated as quantum systems. The same
formalism can be employed to represent finite, finite-resolution measurements of classical
systems by requiring that all states be Gaussian [6, 7].
3 Distinguishing Reference from Pointer Degrees of
Freedom
We now turn to the question of commutativity requirements for the Mi. To be of empirical
interest, a “system” S must (1) be distinguishable from its surroundings, (2) be sufficiently
persistent in time to permit multiple observations (at minimum, “preparation” followed by
observation), and (3) occupy more than one state. Determining the state of S at multiple
times requires an ability to distinguish S from its surroundings, i.e., to identify S, at
multiple times. Hence, any system S of empirical interest can be decomposed as S = PR,
where the generalized “pointer” component P indicates the system’s time-varying state,
and the remaining “reference” component R permits, by remaining in a time-invariant state
|R〉, re-identification of S at multiple times. For ordinary items of laboratory apparatus like
voltmeters or oscilloscopes, size, shape, mass, and the layout of controls and displays on the
surface are components of R and their fixed, system-identifying values are components of
|R〉, while the position of the apparatus, what the leads are connected to, control settings,
and what is indicated on the displays are components of P . The state |S〉 of S is then given
by |S〉 = |R〉|P 〉 with |R〉 fixed and only |P 〉 free to vary. Requiring S to be identifiable
by observation is thus requiring |S〉 to be separable as |R〉|P 〉. If my laptop’s mass or the
color of its exterior casing, for example, become entangled with what is displayed in one of
its windows, I will no longer be able to identify it by observation.
This requirement of re-identifiability can be formulated using Zurek’s notion of a “pre-
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dictability sieve” [28], a criterion that allows the future state of a system, here the state |R〉
of the time-invariant reference component R, to be predicted with confidence. Predictability
is only assured if, for all i,
[HW +HOW ,M
(R)
i ] = 0 (8)
where the measurement operators M
(R)
i act on R but not P (cf. [28]; Equation 4.41). In
practice, it is sufficient that, for all i, [HW + HOW ,M
(R)
i ] < δ for some sufficiently small
δ over the course of an experiment involving multiple observations. Given Equation (5),
the predictability sieve condition expressed in Equation (8) requires that system identifica-
tion using the M
(R)
i does not disturb system identity and that pointer-state measurements
using some set of measurement operators M
(P )
j that act only on P do not disrupt system
identification, i.e.,
[M
(R)
i ,M
(R)
j ] = 0 and [M
(R)
i ,M
(P )
j ] = 0 (9)
for all i, j. Nothing, however, requires the pointer measurements M
(P )
j to all mutually
commute, and they do not, for example, if calibration is included ([8] or Section 5 below).
With these definitions, system identification is distinct from system preparation; operations
employed for preparation must preserve system identity and thus must commute with the
M
(R)
i , but need not, and in general will not, commute with the M
(P )
j . Preparation and
observation of the “pointer state” |P 〉 of P will be considered equivalent in what follows.
In terms of the equivalent operators Ei defined on the apparent state space W, an “observ-
able system” S in W can now be operationally defined as
Definition: An observable system S inW is a collection (E
(R)
i , x
(R)
i ) of 1 < k < n mutually
commuting POVMs E
(R)
i defined on the apparent state space W with specified outcomes
xi ∈ {0, 1} that measure “reference” degrees of freedom of W that are fixed and no longer
free in S and hence “identify” S, together with a distinct collection of 1 < l < (n − k)
POVMs E
(P )
j defined on W with unspecified binary outcomes x
(P )
j that measure “pointer”
degrees of freedom of W that remain free in S, where for each E
(P )
j , [E
(P )
j , E
(R)
i ] = 0 for
every E
(R)
i .
Note that, while O and W are collections of degrees of freedom and are hence “ontic”
entities, observable systems are collections of operations and outcomes and are hence in
some sense “epistemic” entities. The notations “S,” “R,” “P ,” and, below, “E” will be
maintained for consistency with the literature, and to recognize that in practice systems
are standardly defined in terms of observational outcomes as noted above.
The l pointer degrees of freedom of S comprise its pointer P and their measured outcome
values constitute its pointer states |P 〉 = |x
(P )
1 ...x
(P )
l 〉. While the E
(P )
j selecting pointer out-
comes are not required to commute, at least pairs of pointer outcomes must be compatible
in any “interesting” system (an EPR/Bell experiment, for example, requires simultaneous
measurement of two pointer states, the “measurement setting” and the outcome, by each
observer (Section 6)). The collection (E
(R)
i , x
(R)
i ) of k specified (POVM, outcome) pairs
specifies the pointer-state independent reference component R and its time-invariant state
|R〉 = |x
(R)
1 ...x
(R)
k 〉. We require that P ∩ R = ∅ and PR = S. For macroscopic systems
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such as laboratory apparatus, the number of pointer degrees of freedom l << n. Hence,
the number of reference degrees of freedom k ∼ n; this will be assumed in what follows.
Two observable systems S and S ′ are discernible in isolation only if they differ by at least
one reference (POVM, outcome) pair. Every observable system S has a complement S¯ that
is the maximal observable system that does not overlap S. In the limit n→∞, SS¯ → W ,
i.e., S¯ → E as defined above. This limit cannot, clearly, be reached with finite observational
resources; the consequences of this are considered in Section 4 below.
Several remarks are in order:
1. Observable systems are defined here in terms of both the assumed partition of “the
universe” into O and W and the operations employed by O to identify them. They
are, therefore, observer-relative in the sense defined by Rovelli [35] for quantum
states. However, as noted above, the present considerations apply to both classi-
cal and quantum systems provided the finite-resource restriction is respected. This
observer-relativity naturally suggests counterfactual indefiniteness, i.e., that “uniden-
tified systems have no states” (cf. [36]), regardless of the equations of motion they
obey while being observed.
2. The “world” W is not an observable system. As S → W the notion of “system
identification” loses any operational meaning.
3. The apparent state space W coarse-grains W . As will be made precise in the next
section, unless dW >> n (hence effectively,W >> O), waste heat cannot be dissipated
by O and commutativity of observables breaks down. This corresponds to the “large
environment” assumption of decoherence.
4. No assumption is made that W exhibits objective classical randomness. The char-
acterization of the energetic cost of observation as waste heat reflects O’s objective
uncertainty about the distribution of this energetic input across the degrees of freedom
of W .
5. The requirement that every E
(P )
j commutes with all E
(R)
i enables repeated pointer
measurements to have the same outcome, and hence enables “ideal measurements” as
defined by Cabello [37], provided calibration procedures are implemented as discussed
in Section 5.
6. The support of the E
(P )
j and E
(R)
i in W can be considered the apparent or observable
state space S of S; again, this is the usual approach to defining state spaces for
stipulated quantum systems. State transitions in S can be represented as actions of a
discrete observed propagator PS : |S〉|t 7→ |S〉|t+1. This P
S maps each observational
outcome to its successor and so can be regarded as defining a computational process,
regardless of whether the system S is classical or quantum, provided the finite-resource
restriction is respected [19].
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4 System Identification Cannot Be Arbitrarily Refined
In contrast to the operational, observer-dependent conception of “systems” defined above,
classical (or “effectively classical”) macroscopic systems such as laboratory apparatus are
standardly thought of as both observation- and observer-independent. They are, in par-
ticular, standardly viewed both as invariant under decompositions of “the universe” into
alternative observer—world pairs—and as well-defined independently of any particular ob-
server or observables (see [38] for an example of this “realist” position). Let us use the
notation S to indicate an observer-independent (“objective” or “ontic”) system, i.e., one
that is considered well-defined in the absence of any observers, reserving S for “observed
systems” defined operationally as above in terms of sets of observational outcomes. It is,
for example, completely standard in classical physics to describe two observers interacting
with or otherwise obtaining information about a single, observer-independent, macroscopic
“object” S. This assumption of observer-independence is often carried over into quantum
theory. Extensions of the environment as witness formulation of decoherence to models of
quantum Darwinism [32, 33] or quantum-state broadcasting [39, 40], for example, postu-
late that multiple observers can independently interact with separable, redundant encodings
of the eigenvalues of a single, observer-independent interaction HSE between an observer-
independent quantum system S and its observer-independent environment E. That such an
encoding is redundant, i.e., that the multiple “copies” of the information are encoded by
the single, objectively well-defined interaction HSE must be assumed a priori, as it cannot
be established by observation [41]. It is also commonly assumed, for example, in stating the
Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph theorem [42] that multiple “copies” of a single quantum system
can be acted upon (e.g., prepared and/or measured) independently by multiple, mutually
distant observers. The copies in this case are assumed to objectively have all and only the
same degrees of freedom, the same self-Hamiltonian, and the same interaction with their
respective environments.
Here we consider whether, and to what extent, observers subject to the finite resource
restriction imposed in Section 2 can identify, and hence either prepare or measure, a postu-
lated “objective” system S. We first consider, in this section, the case of a single observer O
interacting during one time period with a single S. We then consider two cases of practical
interest: in Section 5, that of a single observer interacting with S during multiple time
periods and, in Section 6, that of multiple observers interacting with S during a single time
period. We show that violations of Leggett–Garg and Bell inequalities, respectively, can be
interpreted as criteria for successful system identification in these two scenarios.
As noted above, the methods developed here apply equally to both classical and quantum
systems provided the finite-resource restriction is respected. Let us now assume, as is
typical in classical physics and as the simplest case, that W has an observer-independent,
classical state |W 〉, and first consider the finite case in which W can be described by a dW -
dimensional, classical, binary state space, e.g., a real Hilbert space. Let us also assume that
an observer-independent, classical system S is embedded in W , that O obtains information
specifically from S while dumping waste heat specifically into an observer-independent
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environment E defined by SE = W , and that the dimension dS << dE. We assume that O
interacts with S via a set of operatorsMi as defined by Equation (5) above. The outcomes xi
of this interaction can be associated with unit vectors to construct the apparent state space
S ofO’s observed system S as described above. In this case, O can, given a sufficient number
(i.e., n ≥ dS) of binary measurement operators, refine the observed S to the objective S,i.e.,
the dimension dS → dS << dW , at a energetic cost of
H
(S)
diss = (1/∆t
(O))
∫ τ
t=0
HOSdt→ dSc
(O)kBT (10)
where t is a time coordinate associated with W , and τ → dS∆t
(O) is the interval in t
required by O to identify S at the given refinement. By dissipating H
(S)
diss exclusively into E,
O assures that S remains undisturbed. It is this transfer of waste heat to a large, unobserved,
observer-independent environment that enables the typical classical assumption of arbitrary
measurement resolution and hence real-valued measurement outcomes.
If the assumption that O obtains information specifically from S is now dropped and O
is required to identify S by observation as described above, O must search and therefore
interact with, in the limit, all of W . In this case, refining the observed S to the objective
S requires refining the apparent state space W to the full “ontic” state space of W . The
number of measurement operators required is now n ≥ dW , and the energetic cost is now
H
(W )
diss = (1/∆t
(O))
∫ τ
t=0
HOWdt→ dW c
(O)kBT (11)
where now τ → dW∆t
(O). In this limit, c(O)kBT is transferred, on average, to every binary
degree of freedom of W . The environment E can no longer be treated as an unobserved
“sink” for waste heat, as in the limit every degree of freedom of W must be examined to
see whether it is a degree of freedom of the as-yet unidentified S. Equation (11) does not
depend in any way on W being classical but rather is a straightforward consequence of
Equation (5); it is, therefore, completely general. Hence, we have the following.
Theorem 1: An observed system S cannot be refined to an objective system S with finite
resources.
Proof: Consider the states |W 〉|t=1 and |W 〉|t=k∆t(O) acted on by measurement operators
M
(R)
1 and M
(R)
k , respectively, for some k >> 1. As dW → dW , under increasing refinement,
the maximum value of k → dW , and the energy difference between |W 〉|t=1 and |W 〉|t=k∆t(O)
at maximum k, ∆H1,k → H
(W )
diss . None of the Mi are, however, orthogonal to HOW , so in
this case [M
(R)
1 ,M
(R)
k ] 6= 0. This violates the predictability sieve condition expressed in
Equation (9), rendering |R〉 no longer invariant. Hence, S is, by definition, unidentifiable
in this limit, and the desired refinement of S to S fails. 
Note that Equation (11) is independent of dS: the energy dissipation required for system
identification increases with dW even if dS << dW . As dW → ∞ or becomes continuous,
arbitrary refinement of W requires HOW ∼ HW and again commutativity of the (now in-
finitely or continuously many)M (R) fails. Theorem 1 thus provides a quantitative extension
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of Moore’s qualitative result that finite, finite-resolution observations cannot fully deter-
mine the state space of an otherwise-uncharacterized system [11], and shows that it holds
even in a finite “world” W .
System identification cannot, therefore, be arbitrarily refined to the limit of an “objec-
tive system” even in classical physics. The predictability sieve expressed in Equation (8)
that allows system identification is only operable provided the measurement interaction
HOW << HW and the apparent state space dimension dW << dW . Coarse-graining W is,
therefore, required to identify any embedded system S, even if W is classical; if observer-
independent “objective systems” exist in W , identifiable systems only approximate them.
An observed S can, at best, only be associated with a set {S} of objective systems that
could, in some theoretical model specifying some set of reference operators {M
(R)
i }, generate
the observational outcomes {x
(R)
i } that identify S. The dimensions of the elements of {S}
are constrained only by dW and dS as upper and lower bounds, respectively. Hence, The-
orem 1 rules out any confirmation by finite observations that two independently observed
systems S and S ′, whether classical or quantum, are copies of a single objective S.
In practice, observers search for systems only locally, effectively coupling a small, searched
region of W to a large, unobserved reservoir—the rest of W—into which energy can be
dissipated. If this coupling is weak and the dissipation constant c(O) >> 1, the predictability
sieve condition expressed in Equation (9) fails as search resolution increases, i.e. as S → S.
Observers typically search even for macroscopic systems at low resolution and then refine
the search slightly after plausible candidates have been identified. One may, for example,
locate multiple systems of the right size and shape to be one’s laptop and then refine the
search by looking for identifying marks, checking the splash screen, etc. Refining the search
toward an “objective” limit by examining every transistor, much less every atom, disrupts
the commutativity of the MRi and is therefore infeasible.
5 System Identification at Multiple Times
Let S|t be the observed system identified when O deploys n measurement operators Mi
during the interval between (t − n∆t(O)) and t. Theorem 1 above show that S cannot be
refined to some specific objective S. However, S|t can be associated with a set {S}|t of all
objective systems for which theMi would yield, at t, the outcomes obtained. For example, if
S|t is identified by the two criteria of being red and having no linear dimension greater than
1 m, then the set {S}|t contains all objective systems meeting these criteria at t. If O deploys
theMi at multiple times, a sequence S|t, S|t′, S|t′′ , etc. is obtained, with corresponding sets
of objective systems {S}|t, {S}|t′ , {S}|t′′ , etc. The sequence S|t, S|t′ , and S|t′′ identifies a
single observed system S if there is a time-invariant set of reference outcome values {x
(R)
i }
that fixes a reference state |R〉 and hence a reference component R ⊂ S. However, O cannot
determine by observation that {S}|t = {S}|t′ or even {S}|t ∪ {S}|t′ 6= ∅, as doing so
requires determining the self-Hamiltonians of the S, i.e., arbitrarily accurate refinement
forbidden by Theorem 1. To continue the previous example, O cannot determine that each
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red thing will remain red or that each small thing will remain small without examining, for
each thing, more degrees of freedom than color and size. Hence, even perfect correlation of
each of the reference outcome values x
(R)
i between all pairs of measurement times cannot
gaurantee that O is interacting with the same objective system(s) at t, t′, t′′, etc. If the
probability distributions over pointer outcome values x
(P )
j are time-invariant, their time
correlations are similarly insufficient to guarantee that O is interacting with the same
objective system(s) at all measurement times. Hence, we have the following.
Theorem 2: If for a set of measurementsMi and measurement times tj and tk, the two-time
outcome correlation functions Cjk = 〈xi(tj), xi(tk)〉 satisfy the Leggett–Garg inequality, the
observed system S identified by the Mi cannot be associated with any single element of the
set {S} of objective systems associated with S.
Proof: Mapping each binary outcome from {0, 1} to {−1, 1}, the Leggett–Garg inequality
can be written C21 + C32 − C31 ≤ 1 for consecutive measurements at t1, t2, and t3 [16].
The reference outcomes x
(R)
i and hence the reference state |R〉 must remain fixed at all
observation times to identify S; hence, the x
(R)
i satisfy this inequality trivially. To see that
the fixed x
(R)
i cannot identify any particular element of the set {S} of objective systems
associated with S, it is enough to note that obtaining x
(R)
i from a measurement on S at
t provides no evidence that S was in state |R〉 at t − 1. Hence, if S is to be identified,
it must be identified by correlations between the pointer outcomes x
(P )
j . If these satisfy
the Leggett–Garg inequality, however, each measurement of the x
(P )
j is independent of all
previous as well as all future measurements. Hence, no measurement of the x
(P )
j on S at t
can provide information about the state of S at t− 1. It is, therefore, consistent with both
constant x
(R)
i (t) and classically correlated x
(P )
j (t) that outcomes have been obtained from
a different element of {S} at each measurement time. 
Theorem 2 restates, in effect, the general principle that classical correlation does not imply
joint causation; even perfectly correlated outcome values can have different causal sources.
It shows, in the present context, that an observed system S cannot be associated with a
particular objective S without violating the Leggett–Garg inequality. Violations of this
inequality provide, therefore, evidence that a single objective system has been identified
over time.
To assure violations of the Leggett–Garg inequality, O must choose pointer measurement
operators M
(P )
i such that, for tj < tk, Prob(x
(P )
i (tk) = 1|x
(P )
i (tj) = 1) 6= Prob(x
(P )
i (tk) =
1|x
(P )
i (tj) = 0), i.e., the pointer state |P 〉 must “remember” previous applications of M
(P )
i .
Pointer states with this property are commonplace in classical systems; magnetic hysteresis
and work hardening in metals are familiar examples. Direct measurements of such states
are not non-disturbing. If the pointer states of a macroscopic apparatus “remember” dis-
turbances caused by previous measurements in this way, the standard corrective is frequent
recalibration. Calibrating an apparatus, i.e., using measurement of a designated standard
to adjust (i.e., intentionally disturb), the pointer state of the apparatus, effectively erases
the memory of the previous measurement-induced disturbance. By providing evidence that
the Leggett–Garg inequality has been violated, a need for re-calibration provides evidence
15
of previous use and hence evidence that a single objective system S, i.e., the apparatus, has
been identified.
System identification over time, therefore, requires a significant asymmetry between refer-
ence and pointer degrees of freedom. Measurements of reference degrees of freedom must
be non-disturbing in order for the reference state |R〉 to remain fixed and the observed sys-
tem S to be identifiable. If S is to be identified with an objective S, however, consecutive
pointer measurements cannot be non-disturbing. Re-preparing S between designated, non-
consecutive “informative” measurements, i.e., re-calibration to erase the memory of previous
measurements, allows the “informative” measurements to be mutually non-disturbing and
hence ideal.
Quantum violations of the Leggett–Garg inequality can, clearly, only be observed if the
pointer state component exhibiting the violation is not re-prepared by calibration between
measurements. Observing quantum Leggett–Garg violations while maintaining a constant
objective S requires at least one pointer state component that both exhibits memory of pre-
vious measurements and can be recalibrated between measurements. An apparatus control
setting that is re-set, and hence re-prepared, between measurements satisfies this require-
ment. Here the “standard” to which the state of the control setting is effectively being
calibrated is the observer who manipulates the setting. Note that such control settings can-
not, while preserving their function of enabling re-preparation and hence re-identification,
become entangled with other components of P that register the observational outcomes
of interest. As in the case of R becoming entangled with P discussed in Section 3 above,
entanglement between control and outcome-registering components of P can lead to system-
identification failure.
6 Joint System Identification by Multiple Observers
Suppose Alice deploys measurement operators Ai with outcomes ai(t) to identify and ob-
tain pointer-state outcomes from an observed system S = RP and Bob, who is spacelike
separated from Alice at each measurement time t, deploys measurement operators Bj with
outcomes bj(t) to identify and obtain pointer-state outcomes from an observed system
S ′ = R′P ′. Under what conditions can Alice and Bob conclude, when later comparing
their separate sequences of observations, that they were observing two “parts” of the same
objective system S? It is useful to consider this question from the perspective of an adver-
sarial game; from this perspective, Alice and Bob determining that they share a single S
is equivalent to Alice and Bob determining that they share a communication channel that
cannot be, or at least has not been, manipulated by an adversary, Charlie. Suppose S and
S ′ are connected by a classical, timelike communication channel C, such that SCS ′ = S.
Under what conditions can Alice and Bob conclude that their observations of S and S ′
are unaffected by Charlie breaching and manipulating the channel C? In particular, under
what conditions can Alice and Bob conclude that their observational outcomes obtained
from S and S ′ are not the result of Charlie breaching C and sending instructions to S
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and S ′ that determine the observational outcomes? This question has been extensively
investigated in the guise of quantum communication security [43, 44], and the answer is
well known. Any pattern of classical correlations between |S〉 and |S ′〉 can be undetectably
produced by a manipulative Charlie; therefore, no pattern of classical correlations between
Alice’s and Bob’s observational outcomes can demonstrate that the channel C is secure.
Hence, we have the following.
Theorem 3: If correlations between sequences ai(t) and bj(t) of observational outcomes
obtained by spacelike-separated observers A and B are consistent with a deterministic
hidden-variable theory, they cannot mutually identify a single jointly observed objective
system S.
Proof: Any pattern of correlations between the ai(t) and the bj(t) that is consistent with
a deterministic hidden-variable theory can be implemented by Charlie; hence, any such
pattern of correlations is consistent with A and B observing separate systems, both of
which are manipulated by Charlie. 
As the reference states |R〉 and |R′〉 remain fixed throughout Alice’s and Bob’s measure-
ments to identify the observed systems S and S ′, respectively, and hence remain perfectly
classically correlated, Theorem 3 effectively concerns patterns of correlations between the
pointer-state outcomes a
(P )
i (t) and the b
(P ′)
j (t). Such pointer-state correlations only permit
identification of a single jointly observed objective system S if they are inconsistent with
any deterministic hidden-variable theory.
Patterns of pointer-state correlations that are inconsistent with any deterministic hidden-
variable theory are well-known in the special case in which Alice and Bob perform a canon-
ical EPR/Bell type experiment. In this case, their sets of pointer measurement operators
{A
(P )
i } and {B
(P ′)
j }, respectively, each comprise one “control setting” observable and two
mutually noncommuting, two-valued “outcome” observables; the observed correlations be-
tween the “outcome” observables are inconsistent with any deterministic hidden-variable
theory if and only if they violate at least one Bell/CHSH inequality [45]. Mermin [46] explic-
itly considers deterministic hidden variables as “instruction sets” carried by particles from a
central source to spacelike-separated detectors in discussing such experiments. Correlations
that violate one or more Bell/CHSH inequalities cannot be replicated by such instruction
sets or by a manipulative Charlie, and so provide evidence that Alice and Bob are jointly
observing a single objective system S. Such correlations can, in particular, identify an en-
tangled state of S that Alice and Bob share (for recent experimental demonstrations, see
[47, 48, 49]). They cannot, however, by Theorem 1, specify the complete state space of S.
Therefore, they cannot identify the one system that Alice and Bob are guaranteed to share
under any circumstances, viz. the system comprising everything in the universe except
Alice and Bob.
Two features of the use of Bell/CHSH inequalities as an entanglement witness are of par-
ticular relevance to system identification. First, at least one of the Ai and one of the Bi
must measure the state of a pointer observable not manipulable by Charlie. In the canoni-
cal EPR-type experimental setup, these observables correspond to the orientation settings
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for the polarization/spin measurements, which are assumed to be freely chosen by Alice
and Bob, respectively, at each t. This free-choice assumption rules out super-determinism
[50] by preventing Charlie from specifying correlations involving these settings. As seen in
Section 5 above, the existence of at least one pointer observable controlled by the observer
enables objective system identification over time. Hence, the free-choice assumption can
also be viewed as the assumption that Alice and Bob can each, independently, identify
their respective apparatus as objective. Second, Alice and Bob must, after their obser-
vations have been completed, exchange a classical message encoding their observational
outcomes to compute the correlations observed. This separate, classical communication
step (i.e., use of a LOCC (Local Operations, Classical Communication) protocol) is re-
quired for shared entanglement to serve as a communication resource [51]. It introduces
a second system, the classical message, that Alice and Bob must share, but without the
restriction of spacelike separation. The separate, local observations employed in a LOCC
protocol can be regarded as detecting a Bell/CHSH inequality violation only if the joint
identification of this later, classical message—in practice, Alice and Bob agreeing that they
have securely shared reports of their outcomes—is regarded as unproblematic.
Theorem 3 shows that joint system identification by spacelike-separated observers is demon-
strable empirically only within quantum theory; in classical theory it can at best be assumed.
By showing that joint system identification requires use of a LOCC protocol, it suggests
that all systems are equivalent to communication channels. This idea is implicit in opera-
tional reconstructions of quantum theory [52, 53] and has been made explicit by Grinbaum
[15].
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